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ABSTRACT 
 
SAMUEL REIS-DENNIS: On Blame 
(Under the direction of Thomas Hill) 
 
In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of blame for consequences suggests that 
in many standard cases, blame is only a judgment, and not a reaction (like resentment, 
indignation, or relationship change) to the blamed agent’s behavior. In responding to T.M.’s 
Scanlon’s account of blame in his recent book Moral Dimensions, I argue that considering 
instances of blame for consequences is especially instructive as these cases seem to indicate 
that judgments of moral responsibility (which may or may not lead to resentment, 
relationship change, or other reactions), are essential to our common-sense understanding of 
blame and blameworthiness. 
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Introduction 
 
My friend Ben Weinstein has dubbed himself “The Most Blamed Man in America.” 
Whenever something goes wrong, he claims, my friends and I blame him for it. What does it 
mean to be blamed in this way? Every day, we encounter myriad examples of blame that are 
similar to the blaming of Ben. Headline questions such as, “Who is to blame for the death of 
38 hostages in Algeria?,”1 reports like “Republicans […] worry about the political price if the 
party takes the blame for killing immigration reform,”2 and assertions like “The Lakers are 
struggling, but don’t blame Kobe”3 are pervasive in our discussion of regrettable outcomes. 
These are examples of blame for consequences as opposed to blame for actions. In this 
paper, I will argue that examples of blame for consequences help to show that in many 
standard cases, blame is only a judgment, and not a reaction (like resentment, indignation, or 
relationship change) to the blamed agent’s behavior. I will suggest that the phenomenon of 
blame for consequences is especially instructive as it suggests that judgments of moral 
responsibility (which may or may not lead to resentment, relationship change, or other 
reactions) are essential to our common-sense understanding of blameworthiness. 
I should also make it clear at the outset that I see blame and blameworthiness as 
what Wittgenstein would call “family resemblance” notions. I doubt that any one theory 
                                                 
1  Liying, W. (2013, January 25). Who is to blame for death of 38 hostages in algeria?. Retrieved from 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102774/8108171.html 
 
2  Bennett, B., & Mascaro, L. (2013, January 27). Senators agree on immigration overhaul plan. Retrieved from 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/27/nation/la-na-immigration-20130128 
 
3  McMenamin, D. (2013, January 20). Kobe wants all the blame. not so fast.. Retrieved from 
http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/8863675/kobe-bryant-wants-blame-los-angeles-lakers-woes-
not-simple. 
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attempting to give necessary and sufficient conditions for these concepts will be totally 
adequate. As a result, my analysis will turn entirely upon examples of our use of the terms in 
question. In this paper, I focus on the account T.M. Scanlon develops in his 2008 book 
Moral Dimensions. I will argue that his account is insufficient to give us a satisfactory theory of 
the way we use the concept of blame and its importance in our moral lives. To accomplish 
this task, I will introduce a notion of judgment-centered blame, with a particular focus on 
blame for consequences—only one species of blame, perhaps, but one that is crucial to the 
concept. 
 
2. Scanlon’s Account of Blame 
At the outset of his chapter on blame in Moral Dimensions 4  Scanlon writes that 
accounts of blame generally take one of two forms: “The first idea is essentially evaluative: to 
blame someone is to arrive at a negative assessment of his or her character.  The second is 
punitive: blame is a kind of sanction, a milder form of punishment.”5  Scanlon argues that 
neither of these two sorts of accounts “fit the facts of our moral experience”6 and that a 
relational theory that defines blame as a “modification, on our part, of the intentions, 
dispositions, and expectations that constitute our moral relationship with such a person,”7 is 
more appropriate.  
Scanlon’s discussion of blame in Moral Dimensions comes after three chapters in 
which he argues that the permissibility of an action is generally independent of an agent’s 
                                                 
4 All Scanlon references are to: T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2008). 
 
5 Ibid; 122. 
 
6 Ibid; 121. 
 
7 Ibid; 143. 
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intention: “an act is permissible if, under the circumstances, it would be licensed by those 
principles (which we can ask each other to use in deciding what to do).”8 Scanlon explains 
that “what makes an action wrong is the consideration or considerations that count 
decisively against it, not the agent’s failure to give these considerations the proper weight.”9   
One of the consequences of the separation of permissibility and good intention 
involves the concept of blame, which is often associated with the intentions of the blamed 
agent. 10   For moral theories that cite intention as a deciding factor in determining 
permissibility, this link between impermissibility (or “wrongness” as Scanlon sometimes calls 
it) and blame is not a problem: generally speaking, such theories can claim that blameworthy 
actions are wrong and wrong actions are blameworthy. But because Scanlon allows for 
certain kinds of ill-intentioned and negligent actions to be permissible, he has work to do in 
explaining the connection (or lack thereof) between permissibility and blame.  
Scanlon sees this deviation from standard accounts of blame as an advantage of his 
account, which contends that “to blame a person for an action…is to take that action to 
indicate something about the person that impairs one’s relationship with him or her, and to 
understand that relationship in a way that reflects that impairment.”11   
According to Scanlon, the relational account of blame “[fits] the facts of our moral 
experience […] and the significance it has for us.  It also explains various facts about […] the 
ethics of blame: about who can be blamed, who has standing to blame, and why we should 
blame.”12 In this paper, I examine those features of Scanlon’s theory of blame that he sees as 
                                                 
8 Ibid; 49. 
 
9 Ibid; 43. 
 
10 Ibid; 124. 
 
11 Ibid; 150. 
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major advantages, highlighting some blame phenomena that I think Scanlon’s account fails 
to capture. To do so, I will argue that in many important cases, blame does not require a 
reaction to the blamed agent’s misdeed. To blame someone is only to make a certain kind of 
judgment that does not imply any negative character assessment, resentment, or relationship 
change. In making this case, I will draw attention to a species of blame that Scanlon and 
other prominent blame theorists have not discussed explicitly: blame for consequences as 
opposed to actions.13 I will explain what I take to be the moral and practical significance of 
blame for consequences and argue that this kind of blame generates counterexamples to 
Scanlon’s relational account of blame and blameworthiness.  
I will contend that one interesting and important feature of blame for consequences 
is that this kind of blame does not seem to require any negative assessment of the blamed 
agent’s character or any kind of reevaluation of our relationships with him or her. Instead, I 
claim that blaming someone for a consequence involves a compound judgment that is both 
causal and normative. When we blame someone for a consequence or state of affairs, we 
typically mean both that the person was at least partially causally responsible for the 
consequence, and that he or she became causally responsible via some ill-intentioned or 
negligent action. Thus, the terms and phrases we use when we talk about blame often require 
us to work “backward,” beginning with some negative outcome or bad state of affairs, and 
arriving at an accurate attribution of fault for that outcome. It is important to note that this 
use of the concept of blame amounts to more than a statement of causation: it is an 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Ibid; 123. 
 
13 While there is of course a substantial literature on moral luck, moral responsibility, duty to repay, strict 
liability, etc., recent moral philosophers writing on blame have framed their inquiries solely in terms of blame 
for actions while barely even acknowledging that when non-philosophers talk about blame, it is almost always 
in the context of blame for bad consequences. Scanlon and Strawson are two examples of such theorists, but 
there are others. George Sher, for example, in his 2005 book In Praise of Blame dedicates one sentence in a 
somewhat dismissive footnote to the notion of blame for consequences. In her 2006 book Merit, Meaning, and 
Human Bondage, Nomy Arpaly does not address the phenomenon at all. 
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attribution of fault or wrongdoing that is appropriate only when someone has acted badly, 
usually with bad intentions or negligence. 
Scanlon’s account of blame begins with a challenge inspired by Thomas Nagel’s 1979 
piece Moral Luck. Nagel imagines a case in which a driver kills a child:  
If the driver was guilty of even a minor degree of negligence—failing to have his 
brakes checked recently, for example—then if that negligence contributes to the 
death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He will blame himself for the 
death. And what makes this an example of moral luck is that he would have to blame 
himself only slightly for the negligence if no situation arose which required him to 
brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the negligence is the same in 
both cases, and the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his 
path.14 
According to Scanlon, one lesson of this case is that blame and wrongness (understood in 
terms of permissibility) can come apart. Scanlon writes that “an adequate account of blame 
should either explain how blame can vary in the way that these examples suggest or else give 
a convincing explanation of why it should appear to do so even though it does not.”15  
 Before using his own account to resolve the moral luck problem, Scanlon considers 
the thought that blame essentially involves a character assessment:  
It is […] natural to say that blaming someone is a matter of assessing his or her 
character, whereas wrongness has to do only with the action he or she performed. 
There is clearly something right about this. But although blaming may have to do 
                                                 
14 Nagel in Scanlon; 126. 
 
15 Ibid; 126. It is worth noting that Nagel’s case is a classic example of blame for a consequence as opposed to 
an action. Notice that Nagel’s unlucky driver will blame himself for the death of the child. Interestingly, this is the 
only case in Scanlon’s discussion of blame that involves blame for a consequence, and Scanlon never addresses 
this fact or makes a distinction between blame for actions and blame for consequences specifically. I discuss 
this case, and Scanlon’s reading of it, later in the paper. 
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with character, it also has to do with an action—at least in many cases we blame a 
person for something. So it might be said that to blame a person for something is to 
take that action as showing something negative about that person’s character. This 
has the advantage of explaining why blame should depend on the agent’s reasons for 
performing an action, and on the conditions (such as great stress) under which an 
action is performed, since both of these are relevant to the question of what one can 
infer from an action about the character of the agent.16 
But even though Scanlon sees character assessment (or at least something close to it) as 
essential to blame, he argues that a simple version of the character assessment view is 
insufficient, for two reasons. First, he writes that: “By itself, however, [the simple character 
assessment] view does not explain the distinctive weight that moral blame seems to have. 
Unless we say more about why we are interested in this kind of character assessment, it may 
seem to be a pointless exercise of moral ‘grades.’” 17  Second, Scanlon argues that the 
character assessment account of blame does not help us to answer Nagel’s challenge. 
Intuitively, the problem with moral luck was that blame seemed to differ even when the 
agents’ actions reflected identical moral characters: “The driver in Nagel’s example has 
exactly the same character—has shown the same degree of carelessness—if a child runs out 
in front of him or if one does not. So if there is any difference in the blame that is 
appropriate in the two cases, blame must involve something other than the assessment of 
character.”18  
 To isolate the piece of blame missing from the character assessment view, Scanlon 
                                                 
16 Ibid; 126. 
 
17 Ibid; 127. 
 
18 Ibid; 127. 
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examines Peter Strawson’s proposal that ties blame to the presence of certain “reactive 
attitudes such as resentment and indignation.” 19  Like the character assessment theory, 
Scanlon sees advantages in endorsing a reactive attitude account of blame. The proposal, 
Scanlon notes, explains why we care about blame, confirming its status as a practice that 
goes beyond “pointless grading”—coming to feel resentment toward someone can be 
significant. Moreover, Scanlon notes that the reactive attitude approach explains how blame 
varies depending on the relationships between the blaming and blamed agent, a virtue that 
he tries to preserve in his own account.  
 But even though Scanlon sees much good in Strawson’s reactive attitude theory of 
blame, he ultimately rejects it on the same grounds as the simple character assessment 
approach. Scanlon writes: “If the reactive attitudes that blame involves are reactions to the 
attitudes of others as manifested in their conduct—for example to the concern for the 
interests of others that their actions manifest—then moral outcome luck still seems 
inexplicable.”20 
 In order to capture the strengths of the character assessment and reactive attitude 
approaches while answering Nagel’s challenge to explain why blame varies in cases of moral 
luck, Scanlon offers his relational theory of blame and blameworthiness:  
Briefly put, my proposal is this: to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is 
to claim that the action shows something about the agent’s attitudes toward others 
that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her. To blame a person is 
to judge him or her to be blameworthy and to take your relationship with him or her 
to be modified in a way that this judgment of impaired relations holds to be 
                                                 
19 Ibid; 127. 
 
20 Ibid; 128. 
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appropriate.21 
Roughly, Scanlon argues that his relational account can make sense of a variation in blame in 
moral luck cases like Nagel’s because actually killing the child significantly alters the unlucky 
driver’s relationship with those affected by the action in ways that the recklessness of the 
morally lucky driver does not.22   
To illuminate the relationship change account, Scanlon imagines learning that, in 
order to win a few laughs at a party, his friend Joe has betrayed his trust by revealing 
embarrassing facts shared in confidence.23 In deciding how to respond, Scanlon outlines 
three options:  
First, I might consider whether I should continue to regard Joe as a friend. An 
answer to this question is a judgment about the meaning of Joe’s action—about what 
it shows about his attitude toward me, considered in relation to the requirements of 
friendship, and about the significance of that attitude for our relationship. Second, I 
might revise my attitude toward Joe in the way that this judgment holds to be 
appropriate [….] Third, I might complain to Joe about his conduct, demand an 
explanation or justification, or indicate in some other way that I no longer see him as 
a friend.24 
Scanlon ties these sorts of responses to Joe’s betrayal to his account of blame. The first 
response (judging that the meaning of Joe’s action warrants a change in the relationship) is a 
                                                 
21 Ibid; 128. It should be noted that Scanlon also holds that an action that serves to confirm pre-existing 
negative judgments about an agent’s character are also blameworthy. And along the same lines, blame can 
consist in taking an agent’s action to confirm (rather than give rise to new) negative character assessments 
(131). 
 
22 Ibid; 151. I will return to the problem of moral luck and Scanlon’s response later in the paper. 
 
23 Ibid; 129. 
 
24 Ibid; 130. 
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judgment of blameworthiness, while blame itself is tied to the second response (actually 
revising the relationship on these grounds).  
 
3. The Moral Relationship 
In the case of friendship, it is relatively easy to see how Scanlon’s account could be 
plausible. When a friend does something ill-intentioned, mean, or that reflects a lack of 
concern for the relationship, it is usually reasonable to revise our relationship with that 
person, or at least to take the action as giving us reason to see the friendship in a different 
light. One challenge for Scanlon is to explain how blame works when we seem to have no 
prior relationship with the blamed agent. How can we make judgments of relationship 
impairment (and revise our relationships) with complete strangers?  
 To explain how we can come to blame people with whom we have no preexisting 
relationship, Scanlon introduces what he calls the “moral relationship.” Scanlon writes that:  
Morality requires that we hold certain attitudes toward one another simply in virtue 
of the fact that we stand in the relation of ‘fellow rational beings.’ It requires us to 
take care not to behave in ways that will harm those to whom we stand in this 
relation, to help them when we can easily do so, not to lie to them or mislead them, 
and so on. A morally good person will have standing intentions to regulate his or her 
behavior in these ways.25 
But Scanlon notes that our interactions with strangers are usually shaped by intentions and 
dispositions that go beyond the scope of the bare minimum attitudes we ought to hold 
toward others and basic prohibitions against causing them harm. This extra good will 
constitutes the moral relationship:  
                                                 
25 Ibid; 140. 
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Good moral relations with others involve being disposed to have certain other 
attitudes. These include, in general, being disposed to be pleased when we hear of 
things going well for other people. We are not morally obligated to have these 
feelings, just as we are not obligated to be pleased when things go well for a friend. 
But one is deficient as a friend if one does not have such feelings, and it is a moral 
deficiency to hope that things go badly for others, even strangers, or to be pleased 
when they do. These attitudes and dispositions define what I am calling the moral 
relationship.26 
With this account of the default relationships we should have with others, Scanlon is in a 
position to extend his relationship impairment account of blame. To judge a stranger to be 
blameworthy, then, is “to judge that their conduct shows something about them that 
indicates this kind of impairment of their relations with others, an impairment that makes it 
appropriate for others to have attitudes toward them different from those that constitute the 
default moral relationship.”27 To actually blame a stranger is to “hold modified attitudes of 
this kind toward him or her.”28  
 
4. Responding to Scanlon 
 I will respond to Scanlon’ relational account of blame in two ways. The first involves 
showing that Scanlon’s account of blame is not exhaustive of the concept. By framing blame 
in terms of a response to an agent’s action that involves an impairment of the relationship, 
Scanlon misses important ways in which we use the concept of blame in ordinary linguistic 
                                                 
26 Ibid; 140. 
 
27 Ibid; 141. 
 
28 Ibid; 141. 
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practice. This critique will be my main focus. The second general line of criticism suggests 
that Scanlon’s view of blame does too much: I will suggest that Scanlon’s theory, if taken 
seriously, would result in intuitively blameless actors coming out not only as blamed but 
blameworthy.  
 I suspect that the first line of attack is the one that Scanlon anticipates. After all, he 
takes care in Moral Dimensions to argue that major rival accounts of blame (the character 
assessment view and the Strawsonian reactive attitude view, specifically) fail to adequately 
explain the phenomenon of moral luck. The charge that I wish to levy against Scanlon is 
similar to the one he raises against these views.  
 
5. An Analysis of Consequence Blame 
The major element of common blaming practice that I do not think Scanlon’s view 
accounts for is a species of blame that involves only a certain kind of judgment. Many of the 
linguistic uses of this kind of blame are what I call consequence or outcome blame. In such 
cases, the blame judgment has two components: We must first hold that the blamed agent is 
at least partially causally responsible for some bad outcome. The second part of the blame 
judgment usually involves holding that his or her causal responsibility came via some ill-
intentioned or negligent action (although in some cases mere disapproval of the action seems 
to be sufficient). In other words, to blame someone for a consequence is to attribute moral 
fault to that person, because of his or her bad intention29 or negligence, for some undesirable 
                                                 
29 By “bad intention,” I mean not only maliciousness or acts that reflect “ill-will,” but also actions that manifest 
a failure to show adequate good will toward others.  Murdering someone for fun, for example, counts as a clear 
case of ill will, but failing to help someone because it is inconvenient could also count as a lack of good will and 
render a person blameworthy.  I will also argue that my account of blame explains non-moral blame.  In such 
cases, actions taken with a “bad” intention could include intentionally flouting the rules of a game or ignoring 
the instructions of a teacher or coach. 
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state of affairs.30 My concern with consequence blame is grounded in ordinary language 
considerations: Our use of the terms and phrases associated with blaming, often (and 
perhaps even usually) involve working “backward,” beginning with some negative 
consequence or bad state of affairs, and arriving at (we hope) an accurate attribution of fault 
for that outcome. The process of investigating the causes of regrettable states of affairs is 
something that we evidently care very much about, and I will say more about the importance 
of this practice and blame’s role in it later in this paper. For now, the key point is that 
outcome blame is a concept that helps us express the results of our searches for causes while 
incorporating a normative evaluation of the causing agents’ roles in the process that led to 
the result.  It is thus important to note that consequence blame as I see it amounts to more 
than a statement of causation: it is an attribution of fault or wrongdoing that is appropriate 
only when someone has acted with bad intentions or negligence. 
 This species of blame should be familiar. Recall the cases I began with: “Who is to 
blame for the death of 38 hostages in Algeria?,” “Republicans […] worry about the political 
price if the party takes the blame for killing immigration reform,” and “The Lakers are 
struggling, but don’t blame Kobe.” It seems to me that in all of these cases, the two 
components of consequence blame that I outlined, the causal and the normative, are 
essential.  
The case of Senate Republicans worrying about “taking the blame” for “killing 
immigration reform” is especially instructive because it allows us to see the two elements of 
outcome blame in practice while illuminating questions about how blameworthiness for 
                                                 
30 Tom Hill and Gerald Postema have reminded me that, in many cases, we build consequences into the 
description of an action. We can describe the same action as “pulling the trigger,” “shooting at someone,” and 
“murder.” What I have in mind in discussing the notion of blame for consequences is blame for states of 
affairs rather than the actions that bring them about. For example, we know that John Wilkes Boothe 
committed murder. To blame him for it, or to blame him for pulling the trigger, is to blame him for an action. 
But to blame him for the murder of Abraham Lincoln, or for the fact that Lincoln is dead, or to say that he’s to blame 
for Lincoln’s death, is to blame him for a consequence.  
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consequences works. For the Senate Republicans, blame comes into question only in the 
context of a search for the causes of some perceived bad outcome, in this case the failure to 
pass immigration reform. This is already a substantial departure from Scanlon and other 
leading blame theorists,31 who focus only on blame for actions. In this case, the causal 
element of blame is easy to locate: it would be impossible for the Republicans to be 
blameworthy for the failure of immigration reform if they were not at least partially causally 
responsible for the failure of the reform efforts. It is important to notice that this causal 
responsibility for an outcome can be the result of multiple actions in combination with 
various contingent, and possibly unlucky, occurrences. The normative element of blame is 
also easy to identify in this example, as the lawmakers’ “worry” about taking the blame for 
immigration reform failure. If their constituents believed that their involvement in the causal 
chain that led to the bad outcome was truly faultless, and that the senators had done nothing 
ill-intentioned, negligent, or otherwise morally problematic, then they would have nothing to 
worry about. The fact that getting the blame for a bad consequence is something to be 
concerned about is evidence that a negative normative judgment of the blamed agent or 
agents is essential to the practice of outcome blame. 
The case also highlights the relationship between blame and blameworthiness for 
bad consequences. Not surprisingly, there are two ways to argue that an agent is not 
blameworthy for a bad outcome. First, one could claim that the blamed agent was not 
actually responsible for the outcome. 32  This kind of absolution from blame should be 
                                                 
31 Arpaly, Sher, and Strawson, for example. 
 
32 Obviously, it would be unreasonable to blame agents for all unforeseen outcomes of distant infractions. For 
example, if tell a small lie that leads causally to some horrifying disaster in 50 years, I do not wish to commit 
myself to the view that I would be blameworthy for the tragedy. A theory of moral responsibility is outside the 
scope of this paper, but my view is that our practices of judging people morally responsible will often play a 
major role in deciding questions of responsibility. So, it is perfectly consistent to hold that Nagel’s unlucky 
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straightforward: Imagine, for example, that someone accuses you of causing the economic 
crash. It would be reasonable to say: “You can’t blame me for that!”  
The second way one can escape blame is more complicated. This second 
phenomenon is normative. It covers those cases in which an agent really is causally 
responsible for a bad outcome, but not through some morally bad action. One way this kind 
of excuse from blame can hold is if the bad outcome was not the result of the agent having 
done something wrong. If, for example, two basketball players collide on the court and one 
of them is injured, the other player, though causally responsible for the bad outcome, cannot 
be legitimately blamed for it. When the player snaps to a reporter: “you can’t blame me for 
his injury!,” he does not mean that his actions did not lead to the unfortunate event, but 
rather that blame is not appropriate because there is no wrongdoing.  
This second kind of excuse from blame can also vindicate agents in a slightly more 
complicated way. Cases involving people who “were just following orders” sometimes 
follow this pattern. The movie Courage Under Fire, for example, opens with a low-ranking 
soldier killing an ally in a friendly fire incident. The soldier, however, had been ordered to 
shoot by Denzel Washington, his commanding officer, who misidentified a tank. Though 
the soldier is causally responsible for the death of his ally, it would be reasonable for him to 
insist that “you can’t blame me” for his comrade’s death. Here, the bad result is both 
attributable to the soldier and the result of another’s morally bad action. But because it was 
the commanding officer rather than the soldier who did something wrong, the soldier has a 
case against his blameworthiness for the slain man’s death.  
 
6. Can Scanlon’s Theory Explain Consequence Blame? 
                                                                                                                                                 
driver is clearly responsible for the death of the child, but I am clearly not responsible for the horrors remotely 
connected to my small lie.  
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I will say more about how we make use of consequence blame later in the paper, but 
for now I want to turn my attention back to Scanlon to see whether or not his relational 
theory can account for blame for consequences. In the previous paragraph, I gave an 
example of someone who is causally responsible, but (at least arguably) not blameworthy, for 
a bad outcome. I explained that such an agent could only be blameless if he did nothing ill-
intentioned or negligent. At this point in my account of outcome blame, one might wonder 
whether blame for a consequence is merely derivative. More specifically, one could ask 
whether or not blame for a consequence essentially depends on a prior blameworthy action 
that then renders the actor eligible to be blamed for that action’s consequences. If the 
answer to that question is “yes,” then perhaps Scanlon could hold that this blame for a prior 
action was the real blame grounding the blame for consequences and that, as such, his theory 
could make sense of blame for consequences after all. In making the case that Scanlon’s 
theory accounts for only one specific kind of blame while neglecting key parts of the 
concept, I will consider cases that I think demonstrate that much of our use of “blame” 
involves only a judgment rather than an action. These judgments can ground our responses 
to agents, their actions, and their consequences, but do not entail them. Blame can be 
judgment-only when applied to actions alone as well, but as we will see in the next 
paragraph, I find pure cases of action blame difficult to get a firm grip on, as the use of the 
word “blame” in such instances strikes me as odd and out of place. Blame for consequences, 
on the other hand, has deep roots in our everyday linguistic practices. As such, most, though 
not all, of the examples I will use to illustrate judgment-only blame are examples of blame 
for consequences. Because this use of “blame” is so prominent, I think that any complete 
theory of blame ought to yield a convincing analysis of these cases. Can Scanlon’s account 
meet this challenge? 
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7. ‘Standard’ Cases of Action Blame 
In order to account for the kind of consequence blame that I have been discussing, 
Scanlon could argue that in order to be blameworthy for an outcome, one must have 
performed a blameworthy action (in the Scanlonian sense) that led to that outcome. In other 
words, the action that led to the bad state of affairs must indicate something about the agent 
that impairs the relationships others can have with him or her. Is this how blame for 
consequences works?  
The answer turns, in part, on whether or not every action that could become a 
necessary condition for the kind of consequence blaming I am discussing is itself grounds for 
relationship change. I am skeptical. In many instances, it seems at least somewhat odd to say 
that we blame someone for his action. To my ear, the language of blame for consequences 
sounds much more natural. Consider the case of two people who have each tried to cause 
each other harm who sit down and attempt to “work out their issues.” When one of the 
parties brings up some bad action, it seems unlikely that he or she would say something like: 
“You set fire to my house, and I blame you for that.” It seems more natural to say 
something like: “You set fire to my house and I hate you, resent you, etc. because of it” or 
“You set fire to my house, f— you!” The Scanlonian strategy involves construing the 
meaning of the statement, “You set fire to my house, and I blame you for that,” as 
something like, “You set fire to my house and I’ve changed my attitude toward you in 
certain ways because of it.”  
There are two problems with the strategy of translating “I blame you for an action” 
into the language of relationship impairment. The first is that it seems arbitrary. For 
example, I see no reason to favor this translation over a Strawsonian one along the lines of, 
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“You set fire to my house and I resent you for it.”33 Second, the whole utterance (“You set 
fire to my house and I blame you for it”) sounds a bit out of place. Most people, I think, 
would probably interpret that statement as emphasizing one of the two features of the 
analysis of outcome blame that I outlined earlier. In other words, we would hear “You set 
fire to my house and I blame you for it,” either as an assertion about the other party’s causal 
role in the arson (“I blame you for it”) or as confirmation that the action really was ill-
intentioned or negligent (perhaps one might use the phrase this way if there was some 
question of mental illness or another potentially mitigating circumstance in play). The weird 
sound of “I blame you” and “I blame him/her” for actions suggests that the language of 
blame is primarily used in the context of blame for consequences. It seems much more 
natural to say, “My house burned down, and he’s to blame for it,” “I’m to the blame for the 
loss of your possessions,” or “Your books all burned? I’ll take the blame for that.” On the 
other hand, “I’m to blame for setting fire to the house” seems odd unless it’s taken as a 
declaration of responsibility (I am to blame, as opposed to someone else) rather than an 
invitation to resent, become indignant, or alter relationships.34   
This appeal to my conception of what sounds natural to say is not meant to be 
decisive, but it is meant to pressure Scanlon to explain his reasons for thinking that the 
nature of blame is tied to relationship change.35 One obvious way for Scanlon to answer 
                                                 
33 I will say more about this translation problem later in the paper. 
 
34 I will return to the subject of action blame toward the end of the paper. 
 
35 Tom Hill suggested to me that “you set fire to my house and I blame you for it” sounds odd in part because 
it seems like a weak a response for such a serious offense. I think he’s right. The seeming softness of the 
utterance, I suspect, is due to the fact that in most cases, to blame someone is just to judge that he or she is 
responsible for a bad state of affairs via some ill-intentioned or negligent action. Thus, to say “I blame you” in 
a case like this seems trivial. (Of course I blame you! You did it!). It’s the reactions (relationship change, 
resentment, violence, etc.) that follow these judgments of blameworthiness that have the teeth. Expressing 
blame all on its own sounds weak. Scanlon, however, cannot acknowledge that the weakness of “I blame you” 
in this case because the utterance implies a change in relationship, which can be quite serious.  
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would be to deny that saying “You set fire to my house and I blame you for it” sounds out 
of place. But Scanlon has other options. Perhaps he, and others who hold that to blame 
someone involves a reaction (relationship change, resentment, etc.) rather than merely a 
judgment, could concede the oddness of “I blame you” in this instance but argue that the 
reactions associated with blame (relationship change in Scanlon’s case) can be, and often are, 
present when actual blame talk is not. Ryan Preston-Roedder suggested to me, for example, 
that even if one admits that “I blame you for it” sounds unnatural here, “I could kill you for 
setting fire to the house” or “I’m so mad at him for setting the fire” seem reasonable, and 
are the sorts of phrases that philosophers associate with blame.  
Responding to this kind of answer allows me to make a methodological point: While 
it is true that philosophers often associate certain reactions with blame (relationship change 
may be one of these), the very fact that so many different kinds of reactions have been 
offered as candidates for the true essence of blame is a point in favor of the kind of 
judgment-only blame that I have been suggesting. The debate over the definition of blame is 
not an instance of philosophers “cleaning up” a concept. In fact, the various efforts of 
philosophers to isolate the essence of action-blame have only led to confusion. Is blame 
resentment, indignation, anger, a wish that the blamed agent would have done otherwise, a 
negative assessment of character, a call for reparation, an invitation to apologize and ask for 
forgiveness, a change in relationship, or something else altogether? Each proposal fits with 
some elements of our blaming practices, but why should we believe that any of them fully 
capture what we mean by the word “blame.” It seems to me that philosophers have made 
things more complicated than necessary, especially because sometimes seems odd to use the 
word “blame” in cases of blame for actions in the first place. My position is that the only 
reliable way to isolate our blaming practices and separate them from other responses to bad 
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actions and states of affairs is to look at the way we actually use the word “blame” in 
everyday life. This is one of the major reasons for my focus on blame for consequences: 
these are the cases in which non-philosophers seem most at home actually speaking in terms 
of blame. 
In the coming sections, I will address more cases of blame for consequences and see 
whether or not Scanlon could make the case that the attributions of blame in these cases 
could be derivative in the way that I have suggested. It will be important to keep in mind 
that even if blameworthiness for a consequence required a prior blameworthy action 
(whatever this would mean), Scanlon would still have work to do. More specifically, he 
would have to show that his relational theory of blame could account for the sort of action 
blameworthiness that makes an agent eligible for legitimate consequence blame. The key 
questions are these: 1) Is it the case that when we judge someone to be blameworthy for a 
consequence we take his or her actions to “show something about the agent’s attitudes 
toward others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her?” 2) When we 
blame someone for a consequence, do we change our relationship with him or her in a way 
that reflects our judgment of his or her having done something to make the relationship 
change justified? 
I think the answer to both of these questions is “not necessarily.” If my arguments 
are successful, they will show that Scanlon’s account of blame fails to account for a 
substantial, and perhaps even foundational, part of our blaming practices. The coming 
examples will suggest that blaming someone for a consequence, or even for the actions that 
led to that consequence, need not involve the kind of relationship impairment that Scanlon 
has in mind. 
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8. Blame for Minor Infractions: 
Scanlon writes that a major advantage of his account of blame is that it “explains 
why blame should be seen as involving assessment of a person’s character…[but] is not just 
pointless grading, or purely prudential calculation.”36 I hold that blame need not always 
function as character assessment. Instead, blame can be simply a judgment of fault for one’s 
part in bringing about a bad state of affairs (in the case of consequence blame), or even a 
mere registering of moral disapproval (in some cases of blame for actions).  
Minor cases of negligence that lead to bad consequences, like when a basketball 
player’s ill-advised shot costs his team a game, or when carelessly leaving a light on when 
leaving the house leads to an inflated electric bill, are examples of blame as a judgment of 
fault for one’s role in bringing about a bad state of affairs that need not involve an 
assessment of the blamed agent’s character. Upon returning to the house, seeing the electric 
bill, or losing the game (encountering the bad state of affairs), it seems natural to ask 
questions, such as, “Why did this happen? Who is to blame?”  In these cases of blame for a 
bad consequence, apportioning blame does not require a reassessment of the miscreants’ 
characters. Scanlon might reply that these are not genuine instances of blame. This answer 
may have some initial plausibility in the basketball case, but not in the light switch example, 
which features a morally problematic action, albeit a very minor one. Here, because the 
infraction is so minute, the blamer can ascribe blame for the higher than usual electric bill 
without reevaluating the blamed agent’s character or modifying the relationship.  
The non-moral case is interesting for another reason as well. Scanlon contends that 
genuine blame must be moral: “Failing to meet the standards of athletic or artistic 
performance, or making mistakes in arithmetic, are not in themselves grounds for blame. 
                                                 
36 Ibid; 153. 
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Such standards do not have the right kind of importance, and their violation does not, in 
itself, have the right kind of significance to make blame appropriate.”37 While I agree that 
moral blame is in an important sense “more significant” than non-moral blame, the 
argument that all blame must be moral clashes with ordinary language considerations. Sports-
related blame may be the clearest case (“The Lakers are struggling, but don’t blame Kobe”), 
but when art exhibitions or math test results disappoint, our concern over “who is to blame” 
seems just as natural. So even though moral blame does have “greater weight” in the sense 
that it reflects a transgression of standards that we tend to care a lot about (usually much 
more than we care about standards of athletic performance, for example), the mechanics of 
blame and our linguistic blaming practices are virtually identical across these different arenas. 
One way Scanlon could salvage the applicability of his relational account in cases of 
blame for minor infractions and their consequences would be to show that our relationships 
with recipients of minor blame, such as the person in the light switch case are impaired when 
we blame them, albeit very slightly, and that because of this, minor infractions do come 
under his umbrella of blame and blameworthiness. This reply seems a bit of a stretch. 
Imagine, for example, that the offense was a singular occurrence rather than part of a pattern 
of negligent behavior. Would relationship change, even minor, be justified? To answer “yes” 
seems not only harsh but also untrue to our moral experience, especially if the blamed agent 
has demonstrated him or herself to be a consistently thoughtful, respectful, and otherwise 
upstanding person. It seems to me that we would not be justified in taking this action as 
(even not-so-significant) evidence that a relationship change would be justified. Still, when 
the inflated electric bill arrives, such a person might say: “Oh, I’m afraid I’m to blame for 
that” (and be correct!). 
                                                 
37 Ibid; 124. 
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Could Scanlon modify his account slightly to accommodate such cases of minor 
negligence? Even if we don’t actually change our relationship with the negligent parties, 
perhaps Scanlon could argue that we store the memory of their actions as “data points.”38 If 
enough of these data points accumulate, they could ultimately become grounds for 
relationship change.  
While I do not wish to deny that this cataloging of minor misdeeds is part of our 
moral experience, we need not be engaged in such record keeping in order to blame 
someone for an action or a consequence. We could stipulate that in the light switch case, for 
example, the blamer has no intention of making a mental note of the negligence and will 
never use it as a datum when evaluating her relationship to the energy waster. My answer to 
this potential modification of Scanlon’s view, then, is essentially an application of the worry 
about the arbitrariness of the relationship-changing account that I raised earlier. When we 
say that we blame the energy waster for the higher than usual electric bill, why should we 
believe that this implies taking the waste as a data point to be stored for future use as 
grounds for relationship change, as opposed to resentment, anger, or anything else?  
Another potential move Scanlon could make involves invoking his distinction 
between blame and blameworthiness. He could say that in this kind of case, the energy 
waster’s action is blameworthy, though not blamed. But this move would be odd, as the 
whole example was built upon the premise that we say “The electric bill is high and I blame 
you” or “The electric bill’s higher than usual? I’ll take the blame for that.”  
There is a simpler explanation of our use of “blame” in these minor negligence cases 
that doesn’t involve forcing relationship change, resentment, or another response into the 
picture: when we blame people for these bad states of affairs, we are making a compound 
                                                 
38 Ryan Preston-Roedder suggested this reply (and terminology) to me in conversation. 
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judgment of causal responsibility and negligent action. Thus, when the energy waster says 
“Blame me for that one,” he’s taking responsibility for the elevated electric bill and 
acknowledging wrongdoing. He’s not (necessarily) inviting his friends to alter their 
relationships with him or to store the memory of his negligence for the future, or noting his 
own diminished ability to be a “friend to himself.”39 
Of course, this attribution of responsibility for the bad state of affairs (or the mere 
acknowledgment of wrong action in the case of blame for action) can be grounds for all 
sorts of responses, including, but not limited to, relationship change. I’ll discuss this role of 
judgment-only blame in more detail later in the paper. 
 
9. Blame for Distant Figures: 
 Historical examples and examples from fiction bring out another difficulty with the 
connection between relationship impairment and blame. Blaming people or characters to 
whom we cannot or do not personally relate raises an obvious question for Scanlon: How 
can relationships that do not exist be impaired? Scanlon attempts to obviate the problem by 
distinguishing between blaming and judging a person blameworthy. Discussing the distance 
problem, Scanlon writes:  
We can judge people to be blameworthy, but such a judgment has mainly vicarious 
significance, as a judgment about how it would have been appropriate for those 
closer to the agent to understand their relations with him…. As our distance from a 
person increases, blame becomes simply a negative evaluation, or attitude of 
disapproval, and even this evaluative element can seem pointless grading unless we 
have some particular reason to be concerned with what the person in question was 
                                                 
39 This is how Scanlon interprets self-blame (Ibid; 154). 
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like.40  
I think that this sentiment accurately reflects a certain kind of use of “blame” and 
“blameworthy.” Still, there are important other uses of the distinction between blame and 
blameworthiness that Scanlon’s account does not consider. In usual cases, we blame people 
after we judge them to be blameworthy. This, I think, is undisputed. However, there are also 
instances in which a victim fails to blame a person who has wronged her because she does 
not realize or does not want to admit that the person is in fact blameworthy. This sort of 
situation often occurs in cases of false belief or incomplete information. Scanlon seems to 
agree to this much, and his view accommodates this potential gap between blame and 
blameworthiness when we blame agents “close to us” for their actions. On Scanlon’s view, 
to blame someone is to take a certain kind of action or enact a sort of plan to change a 
relationship. But blaming someone for a consequence need not involve an action or plan at 
all. If I say that I blame Senate Republicans for the failure of immigration reform, I could 
simply mean that I think that they are causally responsible, via some ill-intentioned or 
negligent action or set of actions, for the fact that the legislation did not pass. In other 
words, blaming them for this consequence involves a judgment rather than an action.41  
I hold that the sort of judgment-only blame that I have been discussing implies only 
a judgment of wrongness or a sense of moral disapproval in the case of blame for actions. In 
cases of blame for consequences, which I take to be the most common and natural uses of 
blame talk, to blame someone is to judge that he or she is at least partially morally 
                                                 
40 Ibid; 146. 
 
41 Of course, it could be, as Ryan Preston-Roedder has suggested to me, that I “change my relationship” to the 
Senators by not voting for them, rooting against them and their initiatives, etc. This is surely right in many 
instances. My point is that this need not be the case. I may simply care about immigration reform and never 
pay any attention to politics whatsoever beyond that one issue. On the other hand, if I do begin to root against, 
or resent, or get angry with Senate Republicans, the judgment-style blameworthiness that I am suggesting will 
be the grounds for the justification of these responses. 
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responsible for bringing about an undesirable state of affairs. To be blameworthy is to be the 
object of an appropriate judgment of this kind: If someone is blameworthy, that means 
blaming him (judging that he is blameworthy) is justified. On this analysis, the relationship 
between blame and blameworthiness does not always have to do with the blamer’s closeness 
to the blamed agent. To judge someone blameworthy in the sense that I have been 
describing just is to blame him, and we can make these judgments even when we are 
substantially “distanced” from the blamed party. 
To blame someone on Scanlon’s view, we must actually take our relationship with 
that person to be impaired.  But there is a sense of “blame” that accommodates the thought 
that when we make judgments about moral responsibility for some bad state of affairs in 
literature, history, or some other distant realm whose people we can have no actual moral 
relationship with, we are not just judging them to be blameworthy, we are actually blaming 
them (the judgment-only sense of blame). The best way to resolve the dispute over whether 
or not we can blame distant figures (and not merely judge them to be blameworthy) is to 
look to our use of the terms. It seems to me that we can and do coherently say things like, “I 
blame Spanish royalty as much as I blame Cortes for the fall of the Aztec Empire,” or “I 
don’t blame Hamlet for not killing King Claudius; he tried his best to act morally.”  
Of course, in some cases, there is a sense in which our blame for fictional or 
historical characters can seem to involve some analogue to relationship change. It is not 
uncommon, for example, for moviegoers to cheer the death of a villain in the theater or for 
readers to root against an evil character in a novel or history book.42 I do not wish to deny or 
diminish these phenomena. Still, I don’t think that these kinds of reactions to fictional or 
historical ill-intention must accompany legitimate blame. Perhaps more importantly, 
                                                 
42 Ryan Preston-Roedder suggested I consider this phenomenon. 
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examining these attitudes forces us to confront the arbitrariness worry once again: How are 
we supposed to tell which of these reactions to fictional evil is the real blame. Is the person 
who judges that Othello would have had good reason to alter his relationship with Iago had 
he been a real person blaming Iago more than the person who resents Iago or the person 
who roots against Iago or who negatively assesses Iago’s character? Why should we favor 
any one of these reactions over another? My account of blame gets to the root of all of these 
reactions: to blame Iago for an action is just to judge that he acted wrongly or even to 
morally disapprove of his performance of that action. To blame him for a consequence is to 
hold that his wrong action led to that bad state of affairs. For any reactive attitude or 
hypothetical relationship change to be justified, this judgment of blame must be justified as 
well. The judgment of blame itself, however, does not imply any hard treatment or reaction 
(just as the judgment that the energy waster is to blame for the high bill was not necessarily 
tied to any attitudes or relationship change). 
Perhaps the most common expression of genuine distance blame involves “blaming 
the victim,” a phrase that arises most prominently in reactions to rape, especially date rape. 
When people “blame the victims” of date rape, what are they doing? According to Scanlon, 
they are revising their relationships with the victims in some way. But in most cases, these 
blamers have no actual relationship with the victims at all. If Scanlon wished to concede that 
victim blame counts as real blame, he might appeal to his analysis of the “moral 
relationship” that I outlined earlier. Employing this concept could help Scanlon show that 
the blamers do have some default relationship with the victims that could be altered. 
According to Scanlon, we stand in a certain moral relationship with others that goes beyond 
the basic prohibitions against causing them pain for no reason. This default position involves 
certain dispositions to treat them well, root for them to succeed, and leave open the 
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possibility of friendship should the right conditions arise. Are those who blame rape victims 
really altering their default moral relationships with them? To say that they are seems 
implausible in many cases. My analysis of consequence blame allows us to take a much 
simpler route: When someone blames the victim of a crime, he or she judges that the victim 
was at least partially morally responsible for her fate. No relationship impairment need be 
involved in victim-blaming, but the practice is still hurtful and offensive, especially in the 
context of rape, because it implies that the rape was the victim’s fault, thereby shifting 
responsibility away from the aggressor.  
There are multiple lines of reply open Scanlon, but they all involve some 
maneuvering. Perhaps Scanlon could argue that this particular use of the word “blame” is 
really just translatable into what he calls “blameworthiness.” In other words, Scanlon could 
argue that people who “blame the victim” are judging that the victim did something that 
would justify us in changing our relationships with him or her, or perhaps even more 
offensively, that justified the aggressor’s actions. The first thing to say to this response is that 
it is a significant departure from the way we use the word “blame,” in that it forces us to 
translate a widely used phrase (“blaming the victim”) into an obscure and somewhat 
technical notion of blameworthiness. More importantly, the re-interpretation of the victim-
blamer’s statements does not match the most intuitive reading of the phenomenon of 
victim-blaming. The key point here is that what victim-blamers blame victims for is not the 
victim’s actions, but rather the aggressor’s actions, which, alternatively described, are (at least 
allegedly) outcomes of the victim’s actions. A theory of blameworthiness that does not 
accommodate blameworthiness for consequences cannot fully capture this thought.  
The most promising response to this case I can offer on Scanlon’s behalf involves 
agreeing that blaming the victim is legitimate blame and insisting that victim blamers really do 
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take their moral relationships with victims to be impaired. At the very least, Scanlon might 
say, victim blamers do not respond to the aggressor’s actions or take the victim’s side in the 
way that they would have otherwise had the victim not acted as she did.43 This might be true, 
at least in most cases of victim blame. But does it really get to the heart of the phenomenon 
of blaming the victim? It seems to me that the reason blaming the victim is so offensive is 
that it implies that the victim is morally responsible for the rape. The offensiveness of victim 
blaming is tied to the judgment of responsibility for the bad consequence. Even if no 
relationship change follows (conceding for the moment that failing to fully “take the side” of 
someone thousands of miles away who the blamer will never meet counts as relationship 
change), holding that wearing revealing clothing, for example, somehow mitigates the 
attacker’s responsibility for his action is legitimate victim blame, and still offensive.  
This case is especially interesting because it serves as an example of the distance in 
our practices between blame for an action and blame for its consequences. When a sexist 
person sees a woman wearing revealing clothing and thinks that her wardrobe selection is 
imprudent or negligent, is he or she blaming the woman for wearing the clothing? To say that 
this kind of judgment of the woman’s action constitutes blame seems like a stretch. Even if 
the passerby ever so slightly alters whatever default relationship he or she has with the 
woman based on her clothing, and says something like “She’d better be careful wearing that. 
Men can’t control themselves,” is that blame? I’m skeptical. In fact, I think that to 
characterize it as such requires a kind of problematic squinting that obscures the way we 
actually employ the word “blame.” Why bother with this misguided quest for artificial 
consistency?  
The story becomes much clearer when we begin with the bad consequence and work 
                                                 
43 Gerald Postema and Ryan Preston-Roedder both raised versions of this response. 
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from there. When we start our investigation with someone who blames a victim for a bad 
outcome, we have a clear use of blame talk. We begin on solid ground. From here, we can 
make the common-sense observation that the judgment of responsibility for the 
consequence is crucial to the attribution of blame. Relationship change based on the victim’s 
actions (or resentment, indignation, etc.) is secondary, if present at all. 
 
10. Partial and Divided Blame: 
I have hinted that Scanlon’s view of blame cannot account for partial blaming. The 
reasons for this are linked to my arguments about the appropriate targets of blame and the 
importance of moral responsibility to our blaming practices.  Scanlon sees blame as a 
concept that can be applied to different agents in varying degrees depending on the level of 
relationship impairment that is justified as a response to the agents’ actions. I have been 
arguing that this attends to one form of blame but neglects important features of the 
concept. Consequence blame, for example, is not necessarily a measurement of relationship 
impairment, but instead a mechanism for attributing moral responsibility for bad states of 
affairs. Because responsibility for bad states of affairs (and in some cases for ill-intentioned 
and negligent behavior as well) can be divided up among multiple agents, my judgment-only 
account accommodates the intuition that one responsible party can be given some of the 
blame for a bad state of affairs, while another can be given the rest. On Scanlon’s account, 
there is no conception of taking the blame, only varying degrees of blaming based on the 
degree of relationship impairment the action in question justifies.  Because Scanlon only 
allows blame for actions and not for consequences, he cannot attribute partial blame for 
consequences in the way that people commonly do.    
To this contention, Scanlon could reply that his account allows for divided and 
 
 
 30
partial blame in the following way: When we say that Kyle deserves most of the blame for a 
bad outcome and that Joshua deserves some blame too, but less than Kyle, we mean that we 
could legitimately take our relationships with both agents to be impaired, but we would be 
justified in seeing our relationship with Kyle as more impaired than our relationship with 
Joshua.44  
But in many standard cases of blame for consequences, this seems wrong. Consider a 
case from the popular television show Jersey Shore. In one episode, a character named Deena 
gets blackout drunk on the Seaside Heights boardwalk, wanders into the street, and gets 
arrested for public intoxication. Her friend J-Woww had previously made a promise to 
Deena’s mother to watch out for Deena and make sure nothing like this happened. When 
the time arrived to keep her promise, however, J-Woww, also drunk, didn’t feel like looking 
after Denna and stumbled home. Who is to blame for Deena’s arrest? It seems to me that 
one could reasonably say that both women are partially blameworthy, but that Deena 
deserves the vast majority of the blame for the incident. But this judgment is not about 
whose action merits more relationship impairment. Rather, it tracks moral responsibility for 
the bad outcome. In fact, the blamer might think that J-Woww’s promise-breaking 
(especially since she knew that an arrest could lead to dismissal from the show) was actually a 
more serious offense than Deena’s public intoxication. This is admittedly a silly example, but 
it illustrates the general point that when we divide “the blame,” the person who deserves the 
lion’s share need not be the person whose actions were most relationship impairing, or even 
morally worst.  
 
11. Blame and Moral Luck: 
                                                 
44 Gerald Postema suggested this extension of Scanlon’s account. 
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A slight modification of the Cortes example I mentioned in the previous section 
poses another kind of issue for Scanlon. Suppose that we discover new evidence that directly 
links the fall of the Aztec Empire to the unfortunate death of some innocent person. To say 
that we blame Cortes, at least partially, for that person’s death, would likely do nothing to 
change or confirm our beliefs about him and the way that it would have been appropriate 
for others to relate to him. With or without the new death, we find Cortes’s behavior 
ruthless and abhorrent, and we base this judgment on the bad intentions and carelessness of 
his actions, not on their effects. Does this mean he is not partially to blame for the results of 
his behavior? It surely does not. Saying that Cortes is to blame, then, has nothing to do with 
the extent to which his contemporaries would have been justified in taking their 
relationships with him as impaired; it is merely an accurate assessment of his role, via his ill-
intentioned actions, in a bad outcome.  
The problem would persist even if Scanlon argued that in fact it does not make sense 
to say that we actually blame Cortes for the innocent person’s death, but only that we judge 
him to be blameworthy for it. Even if there were some good reason to ignore ordinary 
language considerations here, the case would still seem to result in new blameworthiness but 
no new reason to think that Cortes’ contemporaries would be justified in modifying their 
relationships with him.   
Scanlon’s response to this objection would likely lead directly to his discussion of 
moral luck. As we saw at the beginning of the paper, one motivation for Scanlon’s offering a 
theory of blame is to account for moral luck cases, a challenge he thinks other theories have 
failed to meet. The classic moral luck case that Scanlon takes from Thomas Nagel features 
two reckless drivers. Driver A acts irresponsibly by driving like a maniac. Driver B does the 
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same, but a child runs into the street in front of his car and is killed.45 Here, again, is Nagel’s 
analysis: 
If the driver was guilty of even a minor degree of negligence—failing to have his 
brakes checked recently, for example—then if that negligence contributes to the 
death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He will blame himself for the 
death. And what makes this an example of moral luck is that he would have to blame 
himself only slightly for the negligence if no situation arose which required him to 
brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the negligence is the same in 
both cases, and the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his 
path.46 
Though these people acted identically, Scanlon writes that is quite natural for us to think that 
the “causal outcome of [B’s] action multiplies the significance of his fault.”47  Scanlon thinks 
that “an adequate theory of blame should either explain how blame can vary in the way [this] 
example suggests, or give a convincing explanation of why it should appear to even though it 
does not.”48  
Scanlon explains that his relational account can make sense of the variation in blame 
because killing the child significantly alters driver B’s relationship with those affected by the 
action in ways that the recklessness of the morally lucky driver does not.49  I agree that it is 
appropriate for the friends and family members of a car accident victim to alter their outlook 
toward the reckless driver, but this observation does not get to the root of Nagel’s problem. 
                                                 
45 Ibid; 126. 
 
46 Nagel in Scanlon; 126. 
 
47 Scanlon; 150. 
 
48 Ibid; 126. 
 
49 Ibid; 151. 
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Isn’t there a sense in which we are all justified in blaming the driver for the child’s death? If 
prompted, wouldn’t we say that we blame this driver, as opposed to some uninvolved party, 
for example, for the tragedy? We can see the force of this kind of objection by imagining 
that the victim had no family at all. If no one was close to the child, would there be any 
blame? It seems odd to say that there would not be. 
A better way of analyzing the case involves distinguishing explicitly between action 
blame and outcome blame. If we use the language of blame at all to discuss the drivers’ 
actions (apart from consideration of outcomes), then we would, I think, blame them equally 
for their recklessness.50 The driver who killed someone, however, is also blameworthy (in the 
sense that he is the object of a legitimate judgment of responsibility for a bad outcome via 
some ill-intention or negligence) for the consequence of his action, in this case the death of 
the child.   
It is easy to see why Scanlon writes that we are justified in blaming this second driver 
“more.”  I think, however, that his analysis of the case is imprecise. The reason it seems as 
though driver B is “more” blameworthy is not because he deserves more units of blame for 
his action from specific people, but because there is an additional state of affairs that he is 
blameworthy for, in addition to his recklessness. Here, it is worth reexamining Nagel’s set-
up. When Nagel first introduces the case, he writes that if the driver was negligent, then “he 
will blame himself for the death” (my emphasis). In the next sentence, though, Nagel slips into 
the language of action blame: “What makes this an example of moral luck is that he would 
have to blame himself only slightly for the negligence if no situation arose which required 
him to brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child.” This description of the case is 
spot on. The difference between the two cases, and the apparent “new” blame, is due 
                                                 
50 This kind of blame could take many forms, including relationship impairment, resentment, indignation, or 
simple moral disapproval. 
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entirely to the unlucky driver’s blameworthiness for the consequences of his action. But because 
consequence blame entails only a judgment and not an action, we can consistently hold that 
even though he deserves “more” blame than his lucky but equally reckless counterpart, both 
drivers merit equal moral disapproval.  
I think that the judgment-only understanding of blame, and especially a focus on 
blame for consequences, is essential to making sense of our intuitions about moral luck. The 
problem with moral luck (at least the strain of moral luck in play in this particular case) is 
that even though our moral worth is supposed to depend wholly on the things we do that 
are up to us as agents, it seems that our blame can vary based on factors totally outside of 
our control. This seems at best unfair. At worst, one could argue that it undermines our 
concept of moral worth.51 By adopting a judgment-only understanding of the blame for 
consequences featured in moral luck cases, we sharpen our understanding of the difficulty. 
Our blame does vary depending on factors outside of our control (this is clear from the way 
we use blame to talk about Nagel’s two drivers, for example). Still, the judgment-only 
account does not imply anything about the relative moral worth or character of the lucky 
and unlucky people or force us to take a stand on whether or not to treat them differently.  
Of course, this does not mean that the intuitions that one driver deserves worse 
treatment than the other, or is less morally worthy, are wrong. Rather, a judgment-only 
interpretation of our blaming in these cases clarifies the debate about how we should see the 
two agents. The question becomes: Are we justified in treating people differently in response 
to consequences rather than actions? If it turns out that the answer is “yes,” then 
blameworthiness for a consequence will be a necessary condition of the legitimacy of this 
worse treatment. If the answer is “no,” it doesn’t follow that we must change the way we 
                                                 
51 Ryan Preston-Roedder helped me clarify this discussion. 
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talk about the two drivers. The unlucky driver is still to blame for the child’s death simply 
because his reckless actions caused the bad outcome. But that doesn’t mean we are justified 
in treating him worse or judging him to possess a worse moral character than the lucky 
driver. Thus, the judgment-only interpretation of blame in moral luck cases does not compel 
us to take a stand about whether moral luck is a problem for moral theory. Instead, it allows 
us to shift the focus away from our use of “blame” in these cases and redirects us to the real 
question at issue: are people ever morally worthy of worse treatment based on circumstances 
that are entirely out of their control? No matter what we decide, our use of “blame” in these 
situations is unproblematic. Moreover, we can employ blame talk regardless of our closeness 
to the victims or responsible parties. 
At this point, it is worth considering another way that Scanlon could analyze the 
cases of blame that I have been discussing. I have been arguing that judgments of blame are 
appropriately directed at people at a geographical or historical distance and even fictional 
characters. The fact that we often use the word “blame” in these cases (“I blame him for the 
death of that child,” “You can’t blame her for Hamlet’s fate!”) was part to my case that we 
can legitimately blame people with whom we have no real relationship. Many of the 
responses I have crafted on Scanlon’s behalf have involved conceding that these utterances 
do count as legitimate examples of blame, and then trying to situate them in the context of 
some (altered) relationship. It is worth exploring in more detail, however, whether Scanlon 
might go another way, and simply deny that these are real instances of blame altogether. 
Scanlon holds that in cases of problematic actions at a distance, “we can judge 
people to be blameworthy, but such a judgment has mainly vicarious significance, as a 
judgment about how it would have been appropriate for those closer to the agent to 
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understand their relations with him….”52 I have argued that this account of the relationship 
between blame and blameworthiness is untenable because it forces us to diminish, or at least 
make moves to reinterpret, a vast body of ordinary blame talk. But what if Scanlon offered 
an additional argument suggesting that when we apply phrases like “I blame X” to people 
we’ll never meet or to fictional characters, we’re just rehearsing for the situations in which 
we can actually blame others by altering real relationships? This process of rehearsal, Scanlon 
might say, helps us practice applying standards of blame so that our relationship changes are 
justified in cases of “real” blame.53  
But why should we believe that these alleged “rehearsals” are any more or less 
legitimate than other uses of blame? It seems to me that a great portion of our use of 
phrases like “I blame X” will never result in any relationship change. This goes for fictional 
and historical cases obviously, but is also true in situations like the victim-blaming case I 
discussed earlier. I hold that the fact that judgment-only blame accounts for a significant 
slice of our linguistic blaming practices is sufficient to conclude that it counts as “real 
blame.” The next section, however, will show that in addition to constituting a large portion 
of our everyday blame talk, judgment-only blame plays a more significant role in our moral 
practice than mere “rehearsal.” 
 
12. What is Judgment-Only Blame Good For? 
 I have been arguing that blame is often a kind of compound judgment. To blame 
someone for a consequence, for example, is to hold that he or she is at least partially causally 
responsible for some bad outcome via some ill-intentioned or negligent act. But if blaming is 
                                                 
52 Scanlon; 146. 
 
53 Gerald Postema suggested this possible addition to Scanlon’s view to me in conversation. 
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just a judgment of blameworthiness, what is the point of it? Is it simply an exercise in what 
Scanlon calls “pointless assignment of moral ‘grades’”?54 One aim of Scanlon’s work on 
blame is to explain the “distinctive weight that moral blame seems to have.” 55  Does 
consequence blame have this weight? If nothing comes of it, why bother with it at all? 
 There are at least three ways in which consequence blame as I have described it is 
valuable and worthwhile. The first is historical and interpretive. For a variety of reasons,56 
figuring out who is to blame for history’s “bad states of affairs” is something we care about. 
I suspect that answering historical questions of blameworthiness is critical for our 
understanding of the present and future, but the enterprise is also worthwhile in its own 
right. Cases in which the violation of moral standards leads to a bad outcome are rich and 
interesting. It is not surprising that so many of our history books, novels, and films revolve 
around just these sorts of blameworthy cases and characters. It is important to emphasize 
that this literary and historical interest in blaming and blameworthiness goes beyond the 
prudential. We value truth and good literary and historical interpretation for their own merit, 
even if we stand to gain nothing beyond insight alone. Blame for fictional characters 
highlights this point. One of my most memorable high school paper assignments asked 
students: “Who do you blame for the deaths of Romeo and Juliet?” 
 The second role of consequence blame is practical: people do not like others to 
think that their actions were ill-intentioned or negligent, especially if those actions caused a 
bad state of affairs. Along with the third function of consequence blame that I’ll address 
soon, this second function gives it at least some of the “characteristic weight” that Scanlon 
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56 I’ll leave the specifics to psychologists.  
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sought to explain. By tracking who is to blame for bad outcomes, we give people a reason to 
act in accordance with moral standards. Though this function of judgment-only blame is 
prudential, it is important to emphasize that it does not require that any action or attitude 
accompany the judgment of blameworthiness. Generally, most people would rather not “get 
the blame” for something even when they know that no relationship impairment, harsh 
treatment, or resentful attitude will result from others’ judgments of blameworthiness. The 
same is true of self-blame. The undesirability of judging oneself blameworthy for something 
does not necessarily have anything to do with a diminished ability to “be one’s own friend,” 
as Scanlon puts it.57 While this kind of adjustment of one’s self-regard may occur, self-blame 
can exist without it. It is bad enough to have the experience of knowing that your ill-
intentioned or negligent action led to a bad consequence. No feeling of resentment, 
adjustment of self-friendship, or even character assessment, need be involved for such a 
judgment to be painful and powerful.  
 Third, and perhaps most important, the kind of blameworthiness that I have been 
discussing is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of our reactions (like resentment or 
relationship alteration) to agents who break moral rules. If indignation or the reduction of 
goodwill in response to bad behavior or the facilitation of a bad outcome is ever justified, 
the offending party must be blameworthy. A case of blame for a bad consequence brings 
this point out nicely. Imagine someone dwelling on a dispute that resulted in the loss of what 
had been a meaningful friendship. If he is justified in his resentment or anger toward his 
friend, his judgment that his friend is to blame for the fight must be correct.  
Judgment-only blame can function this way in action-blame cases as well. In order to 
be justified in resenting someone for an action, our judgment that the action was 
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blameworthy in the judgment sense that I have been discussing must be accurate. In most 
cases, this will mean that the action must have been ill-intentioned or negligent. The 
important thing to note here is that resentment and/or relationship changes that may 
accompany such a judgment are not essential to blaming itself, at least in the judgment-only 
sense that I have been describing. Rather, these are merely responses to blameworthy action. 
I do not wish to take a position on whether blameworthiness is sufficient for the legitimacy 
of these reactions, but I do think that it is necessary. 
 Not surprisingly, this judgment-based species of blame matches with a roughly 
corresponding notion of forgiveness. Scanlon writes that if his account is correct, 
“forgiveness involves the restoration of an impaired relationship, perhaps in modified form. 
What forgiveness requires is some change in attitude on the part of the blamed person that 
makes this restored relationship one that all parties can endorse.” 58  This analysis of 
forgiveness gets at something important. In fact, I do not doubt that forgiveness often does 
function roughly in the way Scanlon suggests.59 Still, Scanlon’s account of forgiveness does 
not fit with another, more historically-minded way we talk about forgiveness. For example, if 
Greg forgives Brandon for wronging him, their relationship might be restored, but this 
would not necessarily mean that Greg would cease to say he blames Brandon for his action. 
On Scanlon’s account, if we asked Greg if he still blamed Brandon, Greg’s saying “yes” 
would mean that he continues to see their relationship as impaired. It would be incoherent 
for Greg to insist that the relationship was fully restored but that he still blames Brandon for 
what he did. But we actually speak this way frequently. To say that you no longer blame 
someone can often mean something quite different from merely saying that your relationship 
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59 I also think that simply ceasing to express or hold certain reactive attitudes toward an offender can constitute 
forgiveness in many cases. 
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with him is restored to normal: it can mean that after analyzing the situation, you realize that 
he was not guilty of ill-intention or negligence in the way you had thought he was.  
In the case of blame for a consequence, termination of blame can be grounded in the 
realization that the blamed agent was not in fact causally responsible for the bad outcome 
(“At first, I blamed my brother for my parents’ divorce, but I don’t anymore”). Moreover, it 
seems perfectly reasonable to forgive someone for, say, carelessly leaving a light on upon 
leaving the house, while continuing to hold her responsible by acknowledging that she is to 
blame for her negligent action and its consequences. In this case, no change in the blamed 
agent’s attitude need accompany the forgiveness, as the action (though giving rise to 
blameworthiness) may not have been a reflection of a problematic attitude in the first place, 
but rather just a one-off instance of carelessness.  
Perhaps the most prominent of the responses that blameworthiness for a 
consequence can ground is an obligation to repair damage or compensate for a bad 
outcome. 60  Consequence blame does not track these obligations perfectly, as there are 
instances of strict liability in which an agent can be obligated to repair damage even when he 
or she has done nothing ill-intentioned or negligent. In typical cases, however, duties to 
compensate or repair are usually rooted in blameworthiness of the sort I have been 
describing. Only when the blamed agent’s ill-intentioned or negligent actions actually caused 
the damage, that is to say only when the agent is blameworthy for the consequences, can he 
incur a moral obligation to repay.   
 
13. A Few Words About Blame for Actions 
 Earlier, I claimed that the language of action blame can sometimes sound a bit odd. I 
                                                 
60 Tom Hill, Gerald Postema, and Ryan Preston-Roedder all made a version of this point in comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
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argued that blame is more naturally situated in the context of attribution of fault for bad 
outcomes, noting that sentences like, “I blame you for burning my house down,” would 
often be interpreted as emphasizing that you are to blame for burning the house (as opposed 
to someone else), rather than as an expression of a change in relationship, even though 
relationship alteration is clearly a justified response to the action.  
 Still, it would be a mistake to think that we never speak in terms of action blame. 
Perhaps the most powerful evidence of action-blame language is the prominence of the 
phrase, “I don’t blame you,” which is usually used to excuse an agent from blame when he 
would otherwise merit it. For example, we might say “I don’t blame you” to a parent who, in 
a frantic rush to save her child from drowning, caused damage to someone’s private 
property. The importance of “I don’t blame you” for my purposes is that it implies that, 
under normal circumstances, we would blame the person in question for his or her action. I 
have spent much of the paper arguing that Scanlon’s account is lacking because it doesn’t 
address blame for bad consequences. But even if my criticisms on this score are justified, 
Scanlon’s relational theory of blame might still fit our intuitions about blame for actions. I 
will now briefly explore this possibility. 
Scanlon’s account associates blameworthiness with the blamer’s being justified in 
thinking that the blamed agent’s “action shows something about the agent’s attitudes toward 
others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her.”61 Even though this 
sort of judgment is appropriate in most intuitive cases of blameworthiness, I worry that 
Scanlon’s account of blame for actions would lead to excessive blaming, and not just in 
instances of minor transgressions of moral norms (like the light switch case) that I discussed 
earlier.  
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Imagine a high-school student with abusive parents.  If the student gets into a fight 
at school, we might say: “Well, fighting is wrong, but I blame his parents more than I blame 
him.” In this case, the reason to excuse the student is not because his action does not justify 
us in thinking that his unfortunate behavior shows something about his attitudes that 
impairs others’ relationships with him, but rather because his parents are at least partially 
responsible for his behavior. The student’s circumstances might thus diminish his 
blameworthiness. Still, even the most kind-hearted, understanding person (who really does 
not hold the boy responsible at all) would be justified in altering her relationship with the 
violent student.  Thus, Scanlon cannot excuse the boy from blame without also saying that 
his action shows nothing about his attitudes that could impair our relationships with him. 
Scanlon might try to escape this objection by classifying the case as an instance of genuine 
blame and blameworthiness, but such an answer again clashes with intuitive ordinary 
language considerations. What makes the case problematic for Scanlon is that we explicitly 
deny that the student is fully blameworthy while acknowledging that his actions reveal aspects 
of his character that impair his relationships with others.                                     
The same argument holds in the case of blame for the mentally ill. When I see a 
mentally disturbed man berating a passer-by on the street, it is reasonable to conclude that 
his virulence shows something about his attitudes that impairs my moral relationship with 
him. Still, my intuition is that it would be a stretch to say that I blame the man for his 
actions. In fact, I would likely say the exact opposite: that his condition excuses him from 
blame. But for Scanlon, such a conclusion would entail a contradiction.  If an action reveals 
a relationship-impairing attitude, the agent who performed it is blameworthy. In response to 
this case, Scanlon could argue that the mentally challenged man is in fact blameworthy, but 
would once again run up against strong ordinary language considerations. Alternatively, he 
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could hold that the man’s actions are not relationship-impairing. But this option is also 
unpalatable. After all, the mentally ill man really does not care about treating people with 
respect or civility. It seems reasonable to see our moral relationship with him as impaired, 
and yet unreasonable to blame him for his actions.                                                                                                         
  
14. Conclusion 
This mental illness case brings out one final issue that is worth addressing. I argued 
that the mentally challenged man is not blameworthy for his mean-spirited heckling. Why is 
that? The usual explanation that I have been employing made ill-intention or negligence 
necessary for blameworthiness. But that explanation will not quite work in this instance, as 
one could argue that the man does act with bad intentions and therefore should be blamed. 
This result is not a problem for my purposes, however, because I am not attempting to give 
a universally applicable theory of blame. As I wrote at the beginning of the paper, I see 
blame and blameworthiness as what Wittgenstein would call “family resemblance” notions. I 
am perfectly willing to acknowledge that no one account positing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the appropriate application of these concepts will succeed. As a result, my 
analysis depends entirely upon examples of our ordinary use of the terms in question: In 
order to understand blame, we must examine the way we actually use the term in everyday 
life.  
I concluded that Scanlon’s theory of blame does do well to illustrate certain ways in 
which we use the words “blame” and “blameworthy,” as does Strawson’s reactive attitude 
account.62 Still, I argued that Scanlon’s theory in particular does not provide a satisfactory 
                                                 
62 For example, Strawson’s reactive attitude account explains what seem to me perfectly intelligible cases of the 
following form: Imagine a staunch pacifist who explains that even though her oppressors’ actions are 
blameworthy, she refuses to blame them. This use of “blame” cannot fit with judgment-only blame, as the 
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account of the way we use the concept and its importance in our moral lives. To make this 
case, I focused on the phenomenon of judgment-centered blame, with a particular emphasis 
on cases in which we attribute blame for consequences. This may only be one strain of 
blame, but I have tried to show that it is pervasive. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
pacifist sees blaming as an action to be avoided. It cannot fit with Scanlonian blame because the pacifist’s stance 
is consistent with relationship change even though blame has been explicitly ruled out as a possible response. 
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